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RCRA Coverage for Industrial Sewage Mixed with 
Untreated Domestic Sewage: Comite Pro Rescate De 
La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer 
Authority 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Laws controlling domestic sewage disposal have undergone drastic 
changes in the past two decades. Until recently, provisions of the Clean 
Water Act of 1977 (CWA) 1 (also known as the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA)), or various state codifications of this act, 
controlled sewage treatment and disposal pollution standards.2 In 1984, 
Congress3 passed an important amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). • Provisions of RCRA initially excluded domestic sewage 
from its definition of solid waste. 6 This exclusion is commonly known 
as the Domestic Sewage Exception (DSE). 6 Although RCRA defines 
many important terms, Congress never defines domestic sewage. Under 
RCRA, courts may construe domestic sewage so broadly that any haz-
ardous substance mixed with domestic sewage is excluded from RCRA 
regulation or so narrowly that the exception covers only pure domestic 
sewage and nothing else. Nobody knows with certainty just what "do-
mestic sewage" is and consequently what the extent of the RCRA regu-
lation is. 
The definition of domestic sewage is of great interest to local gov-
1. 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1387 (1988) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) §§ 101-
607)). 
2. Exact provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and possible state codifications of it are 
outside the scope of this article. 
3. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has extremely broad powers under the com-
merce clause to regulate land and water pollution. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92K (1988). 
5. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) defines solid waste as: 
[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment 
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, 
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, 
mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not in-
clude solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage . . . . 
Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988) (emphasis added). 
6. Comite Pro Rescale de Ia Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 693 F. Supp. 
1324 (D.P.R. 1988), vacated, 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990). 
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ernments and industry because of the potential liability associated with 
RCRA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).7 The possibil-
ity of RCRA and CERCLA regulation of sewage treatment poses an 
ominous threat to these entities. 8 
In Comite Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and 
Sewer Authority,9 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that 
courts should construe the domestic sewage exception very narrowly. 
This decision, if followed by other circuits, may eventually mean almost 
any sewage treatment facility which processes industrial wastes mixed 
with domestic sewage may be subject to RCRA regulation. After 
Comite, the exact coverage of the DSE is more uncertain than ever. 
This note examines the First Circuit Comite decision and the im-
plications that this decision may have for those involved in treating and 
disposing of sewage in the United States. Part II examines the scope of 
the DSE problem, including estimates of the types and quantities of 
hazardous materials we dispose of in domestic sewage treatment plants. 
It briefly examines the United States' sewage disposal history leading 
up to the Comite decision. Part III looks at the specific facts of the 
Comite case. Part IV discusses how the First Circuit determined to 
adopt a narrow reading of the domestic sewage exception. Part V con-
tains an analysis of the court's reasoning and the potential impact of its 
decision. Finally, part VI considers the possible future implications of 
including industrial waste mixed with domestic sewage in the RCRA 
definition of solid waste. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Sewage Treatment in the United States 
Early settlers in the United States did not "treat" human waste. In 
cities, sewage often flowed in open gutter systems. Cities which built 
underground sewage systems generally dumped raw sewage into 
streams, rivers, lakes, or oceans. Aside from large population centers, 
which quickly faced problems of waste disposal/ 0 it took many years 
7. Both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) are found 
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988). 
8. See infra part II.B. 
9. 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990). "Comite Pro Rescale 
De La Salud" is Spanish for Committee to Rescue Health. ld. at 182. [hereinafter Comite]. 
10. These problems included inadequate sewage and garbage disposal systems and the associ-
ated spread of diseases. 
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for early Americans to notice or care that their actions were having a 
negative effect on the environment. 
Initially, the federal government exercised negligible control over 
pollution in the states. Congress "passed its first important pollution 
control law in 1899" (the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899), which 
prohibited dumping of anything except "sew[age] into navigable wa-
ters."11 However, this act "was almost never enforced."12 Although 
many in the 19th Century were strong and vocal advocates of environ-
mental preservation and protection, 18 Congress did not make environ-
mental law a priority until the social revolution of the 1960s. 
With the development of the commerce clause doctrine, 14 Congress 
began exercising more and more control over environmental issues. As 
people experienced more negative effects of environmental pollution, 
the federal government and the states started to pass laws to control 
pollution. As early as 1966, the Fourth Circuit declared that riparian 
landowners had no vested right to dump pollution into navigable 
waterways. 111 • 
One of the first major pieces of environmental legislation which 
the United States enforced was the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 (NEPA). 16 To date, Congress has passed dozens of comprehen-
sive environmental bills17 regulating everything from the upper atmo-
11. A. McGowan, Environmental Pollution, 6 WoRLD BooK ENCYCLOPEDIA 339 (1988). 
12. /d. 
13. Strong and vocal advocates included Henry David Thoreau, Charles Darwin, and others. 
14. Not until the relatively recent explosion of Congressional authority under the broad in-
terpretation of the commerce clause has Congress possessed the power, let alone the desire, to 
regulate pollution. For a more complete view of the growth in federal regulation based on ex-
panded authority under the commerce clause, see G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 121-68 
(1985). During the past few decades, "[a] number of courts have recognized that discharge of 
pollutants into the nation's waters ... has the potential for exerting substantial effects on inter-
state commerce." Brief of Amici Curiae State of California at IS, United States v. Riverside 
Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Brief]. This brief points out that 
pollution can affect fish, Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803 (lOth Cir. 1984), can affect the 
scenery of lakes and streams which tourists use, United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1210 (7th 
Cir. 1979), and can degrade agriculture sold in interstate commerce, United States v. Earth Sci-
ences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 37S (lOth Cir 1979). Brief at IS n.IO. 
15. United States v. S31.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 91S, 918 (4th Cir. 1966). In this case, a 
riparian landowner sought compensation for an eminent domain taking and for the requirement 
that he treat wastes generated in his textile plant. Each of these issues resulted from the establish-
ment of the United States Hartwell Dam and Reservoir Project which changed the South Carolina 
pollution rating for a portion of his land due to its being covered by water. South Carolina re-
quired him to construct pollution control facilities. The U.S. Government compensated the land-
owner for the taking of the land, but the court held that he had lost no rights by losing his 
authority to pollute the river at will. Pollution was no longer classified as a reasonable use of a 
stream by riparian landowners. /d. at 91S, 917-19. 
16. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370(b) (1988). 
17. Some of these environmental bills include the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
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sphere to the earth's subsurface and from the sea surface to the ocean 
floor. 
B. CWA, RCRA, and CERCLA 
The courts have recognized that Congress has broad powers to 
regulate pollution. Courts have generally construed these regulations in 
a way which gives them maximum effect. 
The focus of the CW A is to control pollution in navigable wa-
ters.18 The RCRA focuses on the problems associated with the huge 
amounts of hazardous materials we generate each year. Its provisions 
regulate the generation, transportation, storage, and disposaP9 of haz-
ardous substances. Congress intended RCRA to be a comprehensive 
"cradle to grave" regulation for hazardous wastes. 20 The statute re-
quires the EPA to administer RCRA programs and provides for federal 
enforcement of the RCRA provisions. 21 But it also allows states to 
ticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), IS 
U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1988); the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA) 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 528-31 (1988); the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 
(1988); the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988); the Forest and 
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-87 (1988); the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C §§ 1201-11, 1231-1328 (1988); the 
Mining and Mineral Resources Research Institute Act of 1984 (MMRRIA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1221-
30 (1988); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1401-45 (1988); the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988); 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70b (1988); SWDA 
or RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92K (1988); the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 
(1988); CERCLA, §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-75 (1988); the Emergency Planning and Com-
munity Right-To-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRTKA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (1988); and the Fed-
eral Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1988), to name a 
few. Although the EPA is continuing to write implementing regulations for many of these statutes, 
the Code of Federal Regulations governing environmental issues has now exceeded the Tax Code 
in size. Many see Environmental Law as the Anti-Trust Law field of the 1990s. 
18. See United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 438 F. Supp. 945 (W.O. Tenn. 1976). The 
Act provides for: 
[the J establishment of effluent standards for treatment plants as well as pretreatment 
standards for discharges into sewers that lead to treatment plants. The rationale for 
pretreatment standards is two fold: first, some substances are incompatible with the 
design of the treatment plant and interfere with the plant's treatment of other wastes; 
and second, some substances are not affected by the treatment plant and pass directly 
through it into tributaries or navigable waters. 
Comite, 693 F. Supp. at 1329 (citation omitted). 
19. The RCRA storage and disposal regulations are applicable for both the short and long 
term. 
20. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1988). 
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988). The Federal Enforcement section contains provisions for 
issuing compliance orders and for holding public hearings to discuss actions in case of violation of 
a compliance order. The section also deals with criminal penalties, knowing endangerment, civil 
penalties, and interim corrective actions. /d. 
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achieve "primacy" and run their own programs with EPA authority. 22 
Although the RCRA definition of solid waste excludes domestic 
sewage, there is no RCRA definition of domestic sewage. Congress left 
the implementing tasks of writing RCRA regulations and definitions to 
the EPA.23 One definition of domestic sewage is found in the EPA's 
introduction section to a request for comments. It states: "[The] EPA 
has, therefore, decided that a waste falls within the domestic sewage 
exception when it first enters a sewer system that will mix it with sani-
tary wastes prior to storage or treatment by a Publicly Owned Treat-
ment Work [POTW]."2• 
Domestic sewage frequently contains varying quantities of RCRA 
defined hazardous substances. In fact, "[a]bout eighty percent of the 
nation's sewage comes from industrial sources."26 Some scholars believe 
it is time to eliminate the "RCRA-DSE loophole" along with other 
RCRA loopholes,26 which amount to excluding some 40 million metric 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988) (SWDA, § 3006). 
23. The RCRA statute provides: 
The Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency J shall integrate all provi-
sions of this chapter for purposes of administration and enforcement and shall avoid 
duplication, to the maximum extent practicable, with appropriate provisions of the 
Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Marine Protection, Re-
search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, and such other Acts of Congress as grant regula-
tory authority to the Administrator. Such integration shall be effected only to the extent 
that it can be done in a manner consistent with the goals and policies expressed in this 
chapter and in the other acts referred to in this subsection. 
42 U.S. C. § 6905(b)(l) (1988) (citations omitted). 
24. Comite, 693 F. Supp. at 1328 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 33084, 33097 (1980)) (emphasis in 
original). Publicly owned treatment works [POTWs] include: "[A]ny device or system used in the 
treatment ... of municipal sewage or industrial wastes of a liquid nature which is owned by a 
"State" or "Municipality ... This definition includes sewers, pipes or other conveyances only if 
they convey waste water to a POTW providing treatment." 40 C.F.R § 122.1 (1990) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
25. M. Bowman, Sewage, 17 WoRLD BooK ENCYCLOPEDIA 327 (1988). 
26. Another loophole is the "small quantity generators" loophole, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (d) 
(1988). This exception applies to generators who produce under 100 kilograms per month of 
hazardous wastes, while those that produce between 100 and 1,000 kg/month have intermediate 
standards. Robse & Gulley, The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984: A Dramatic 
Overhaul of the Way America Manages its Hazardous Wastes, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10458 (1984). 
In addition, there is the "household waste exclusion" loophole. This exclusion reads: 
A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass burning of municipal 
solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise man-
aging hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation under this subchapter, if-
(1) such facility 
(A) receives and burns only-
(i) household waste (from single and multiple dwellings, hotels, motels, and 
other residential sources), and 
(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not contain 
hazardous waste . . . under this section, and 
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tons of hazardous substances per year from RCRA regulation. 27 These 
loopholes, however, are practical necessities. They allow us to dispose 
of huge volumes of wastes a little at a time outside RCRA control. 
These excluded wastes include accumulations of small quantities of 
hazardous materials, which households and businesses routinely dispose 
of. The EPA simply does not have the resources to regulate these dis-
charges from millions of dwellings and businesses. Clearly, Congress 
and the EPA had to draw the line somewhere. 
As late as 1986, the EPA defended the DSE and said that domes-
tic waste should continue to be excluded from the definition of solid 
waste.28 In addition to the RCRA exclusions, CERCLA also excludes 
certain "federally permitted releases" of hazardous materials when they 
occur under the CWA, the RCRA, the Clean Air Act (CAA), or the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).29 
Even though the CW A regulates domestic sewage discharges, 
many RCRA hazardous substances are not on the CW A hazardous 
substance list. This CW A generosity means that many tons of RCRA 
hazardous substances exit POTWs each year. The EPA, in a recent 
study, estimated "that 178,000 metric tons of wastes considered hazard-
ous under RCRA are discharged into the nation's sewer systems each 
year."30 Of these, only "92,000 tons are considered hazardous under 
the [Clean] Water Act."31 Although the EPA has a good idea what 
happens to the CW A "priority pollutants" which pass through 
POTWs, they are not clear on what happens to the 64,000 metric tons 
of non-priority hazardous wastes passing through sewage systems an-
nually.32 However, the EPA expects that the volume of some hazardous 
(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established contractual requirements or 
other appropriate notification or inspection procedures to assure that hazardous wastes 
are not received at or burned in such facility. 
SWDA, § 300J(i), 42 U.S.C. § 692J(i). 
CERCLA also excludes natural gas and certain petroleum products. "The term [hazardous 
substance] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not 
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance . . . and the term does not 
include natural gas ... or synthetic gas useable for fuel." CERCLA, § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(14). These exceptions, coupled with the DSE, mean that every year millions of tons of 
hazardous materials remain outside EPA control. 
27. See Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of /983, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Transp., and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98 
Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1983). 
28. See EPA Says Exclusion of Domestic Sewage From Hazardous Waste Law is Valid, 
Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 28, at A-9 (Feb. II, 1986) [hereinafter EPA Says]. 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (I 988). 
30. EPA Says, supra note 28, at A-9. 
31. /d. 
32. "Little is known about what becomes of the 64,000 metric tons of hazardous waste not 
classified as priority pollutants under the [Clean] Water Act." /d. 
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substances used to manufacture organic chemicals and dyes, which 
eventually enter sewer systems, should decline when companies meet 
EPA pretreatment standards. 33 
It would be an understatement to say that sewage treatment plants 
would generally prefer to be excluded from the RCRA and CERCLA 
provisions. Enforcement provisions of the RCRA allow governments or 
private individuals to seek injunctive relief to prevent or clean up 
hazards whenever they can demonstrate that any hazardous or solid 
waste "present[s] an imminent and substantial endangerment to health 
or the environment."34 Triggering RCRA also requires those who gen-
erate, store, transport, or dispose of hazardous wastes to comply with 
extensive EPA registration and permit requirements. 311 
These provisions, combined with the CERCLA provisions, could 
subject parties who deal with contaminated domestic sewage to strict36 
joint and several liability for clean up or accidents. 37 CERCLA liability 
provides for either the federal government, the states, or private parties 
to clean up sites where wastes have been determined to be hazardous to 
persons or the environment and to collect clean-up costs from responsi-
ble parties.36 CERCLA also requires that "[a]ny person in charge of a 
... facility shall, as soon as he has [a] knowledge of any release (other 
than a federally permitted release) of a hazardous substance from such 
. . . facility in [certain quantities )39 . . . immediately notify the Na-
33. /d. 
34. 42 U.S.C § 6973 (1988) (SWDA, § 7003). 
35. RCRA permit requirements are found at 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988) (SWDA, § 3005). 
These requirements are expensive and burdensome and come under serious criticism. See, e.g., 
Freder, Failures of the Current Waste Management Policy, 18 ENVTL. L. 671 (1988). 
36. "[W]hile the term [strict liability] is not used in the Act, CERCLA indirectly provides for 
strict liability by its failure to contain general defenses based on the exercise of due care". 
Superfund at Square One: Promising Statutory Framework Requires Forceful EPA Implementa-
tion, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 10101, 10103 (1981). The statute covering CERCLA liability is CER-
CLA, § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). 
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). This section allows the President, or his designated repre-
sentative, to take remedial action any time there is a release, or imminent threat of release, of 
hazardous materials into the environment and to seek reimbursement for the clean-up expenses 
from the responsible parties. Responsible parties are held jointly and severally liable as a matter of 
federal common law, unless they make special arrangements or qualify for certain very narrow 
exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 204 
(3d Cir. 1982) (RCRA applies to prior owners, operators, or generators of hazardous waste dispo-
sal or storage sites if the materials continue to leak after the effective date of the act. The post-
effective date leaking is an RCRA violation); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp 1326 (E.D. Pa. 
1983) (CERCLA, § 107(a), permits joint and several liability relying on federal common law 
principles). 
38. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 
475 U.S. 355 (1986). 
39. These quantities are established by the EPA under authority of 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1988). 
For any substance not given a different quantity under the article, the amount requiring reporting 
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tional Response Center . . . of such release.'''0 
Furthermore, SARA 41 provisions "creat[ e] strong new incentives 
for private parties to begin active participation" in clean up activities.42 
The potential for added costs for transporting, storing, and disposing of 
sewage or effluent43 as a hazardous waste has great importance for cit-
ies, districts, counties, or other government or private entities involved 
in sewage treatment and disposal. 
C. The Current Sewage Disposal Problem 
Sewage disposal systems process vast quantities of materials each 
year. Although raw sewage contains very little solid material," it does 
contain "substantial quantities of suspended solids, bacteria and other 
microorganisms, toxic metals and synthetic organic compounds."411 Sew-
age treatment tends to concentrate heavy metals in the sludge.46 Sludge 
"deplete[s] dissolved oxygen" causing serious problems for marme 
life.47 
POTWs use a variety of methods to treat domestic sewage and 
dispose of the effluent and sludges. These include either dumping the 
materials in open lagoons and allowing bacterial action to break it 
down or using a two or three step chemical and mechanical treatment 
process.'8 Because the treatment processes involve maintaining a proper 
chemical balance, some industrial pollution can interfere with or dis-
rupt the chemical reactions involved in the operation of a POTW. In-
dustrial sources "may discharge wastes in concentrations or volumes 
that cannot be adequately treated by the receiving POTW."'9 In Ar-
is one pound. 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b) (1988) (CERCLA, § 102(b)). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988) (CERCLA, § 102(a)). 
41. The SARA provisions are the 1986 amendments to CERCLA. 
42. Atkeson, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10360 (1986). 
43. Effluent is the semi-clear liquid result of sewage treatment. "Most sewage eventually 
flows into lakes, oceans, rivers or streams" as effluent. M. Bowman, supra note 25, at 327. 
44. On average, "[i]t contains about a tenth of 1 per cent [sir] solid matter." /d. 
45. Kindt, Solid Wastes and Marine Pollution, 34 CATH. U.L. Rt:v. 37, 42 (1984); NAT'!. 
ADVISORY COMM. OCEANS & ATMOSPHERE, THE ROLE OF THE OCEAN IN WASTE MANAGt:-
MENT STRATEGY 43 (1981). 
46. Lahey, Ocean Dumping of Sewage Sludge: The Tide Turns from Protection to Manage-
ment, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV., 395, 397 (1982). These metals include "cadmium, lead, zinc, 
and mercury" as well as "synthetic organics, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). /d. 
47. Kindt, supra note 45, at 42. 
48. See M. Bowman, supra note 25, at 328-29. 
49. Arkansas Poultry Fed'n v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 852 F.2d 324, 326 
(8th Cir. 1988). In this case, Arkansas Poultry "discharged biological wastes into municipal sew-
age systems [or POTWs]." Id at 326. Petitioners sought "review of the Administrator [of the 
EPA's] actions in promulgating" definitions of "interference" and "pass through" under the Na-
tional Pretreatment Standards (NPS). Id at 325. The NPS definitions are found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 
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kansas Poultry Federation v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency,60 the Eighth Circuit wrote: 
Industrial users' discharges can inhibit or disrupt a POTW and 
thereby cause POTW noncompliance (with its NPDES11 permit lim-
its) by physically disrupting the flow of wastewater through the 
POTW's system, by chemically or physically inhibiting the treatment 
processes, or by hydraulically overloading the plant so that proper 
settlement does not occur or wastes are retained for too short a time to 
receive adequate treatment before discharge. Pollutants discharged by 
industrial users (which cannot by [sic] treated by the POTW may 
pass through the POTW in amounts or concentrations that exceed the 
POTW's NPDES permit limits and) may also contaminate sewage 
sludge that is a by-product of the POTW's treatment processes and 
thereby prevent the POTW from complying with requirements gov-
erning its chosen sewage sludge use of [sic] disposal practices.52 
The fact that the owners and operators of the POTW are govern-
mental agencies does not immunize them from civil or criminal liabil-
ity113 under RCRA114 or CERCLA. With our continued population 
growth, there is a continuing potential for greater problems with sew-
age disposal in the future. 1111 
403.3(i), (n) (1990). 
50. 852 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1988). 
51. NPDES refers to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. This system sets 
standards for POTW discharges into navigable waters of the United States. POTWs get permits 
specifying the conditions and standards that their sewer system discharges must meet. See 33 
u.s.c. § 1342 (1988). 
52. Arkansas, 852 F.2d at 326 (citing General Pretreatment Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 
1 ,586, 1 ,590 (1987) ). 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, the Fourth Circuit 
held that federal employees operating a United States Government facility were subject to criminal 
penalties for illegal discharges of hazardous materials under RCRA. Id. at 748-49. 
54. The RCRA statute provides: 
If an executive agency ... of the Federal Government has jurisdiction over any real 
property or facility ... involve[ d) in solid waste management activities, or such agency 
enters into a contract ... involv[ing] solid waste management activities, then such 
agency shall insure compliance with the guidelines recommended under [RCRA] ... 
in the operation or administration of such property or facility or the performance of 
such contract . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 6964(a)(l) (1988) (SWDA, § 6004(a)(l)). 
55. In fact, in RCRA, Congress specifically found "that the continuing concentration of our 
population in expanding metropolitan and other urban areas has presented these communities 
with serious financial, management, intergovernmental, and technical problems in the disposal of 
solid wastes resulting from the industrial, commercial, domestic, and other activities carried on in 
such areas." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(3) (1988) (SWDA, § 1002(a)(3)). 
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III. FACTS 
The Comite Pro Rescate de la Salud (Comite) filed the initial ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico.66 Although the suit also alleged violations of the CAA and the 
CWA,67 this note examines only the RCRA claims. The complaint al-
leged that the corporate defendants68 had improperly discharged haz-
ardous chemicals into the sewer system at the Barrio Guanajibo Indus-
trial Park, Puerto Rico, in violation of RCRA. 69 The sewage lines led 
to the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) treatment 
facility, a POTW.60 The complaint also alleged that PRASA and Pu-
erto Rico Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO) were violating 
RCRA by transporting, storing, and disposing of hazardous wastes.61 
"Most of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim . . . or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "62 Plaintiffs 
argued that although the CW A did apply to industrial wastes mixed 
with sewage, it was intended to control only those hazardous substances 
which either passed through or interfered with the treatment process.63 
However, the particular sewer system in question leaked so badly that 
much of the material either leaked into the ground or evaporated, thus 
never reaching the POTW.64 
Additionally, plaintiffs argued that to give RCRA its full effect, it 
needed broad interpretation with narrow interpretation of any possible 
exceptions.66 They argued that the DSE intended CWA coverage of 
hazardous substances mixed with domestic sewage with the expectation 
that those materials would end up at a POTW.66 In this case, however, 
the hazardous materials leaked out of the system before it ever reached 
the POTW; therefore, they could not be regulated by the CW A. 67 
Plaintiffs also tried to distinguish pure domestic sewage from industrial 
56. Comite Pro Rescate de Ia Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 693 F. Supp. 
1324 (D.P.R. 1988), vacated, 888 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990). 
57. ld. at 1326. 
58. /d. Defendants included Westinghouse, "Bristol Meyers Company, Bristol Laboratories, 
... Ara Services, Inc., Artex, Inc., Ariela, Inc.," and some dozen other corporate entities. /d. at 
1326 nn.l-2. 
59. /d. at 1326-27. The court never mentions which types of hazardous materials the compa-
nies were dumping into the sewers. 
60. Comite, 693 F. Supp. at 1327-28. 
61. /d. at 1327. 
62. /d. at 1326 (citations omitted). 
63. ld. at 1329. 
64. ld. 
65. /d. 
66. ld. 
67. Id. 
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sewage.68 
Reasoning that Congress could not have intended that industrial 
wastes mixed with domestic sewage should be controlled under both the 
RCRA and the CWA,69 the district court dismissed the RCRA actions 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.70 The 
district court held that the DSE applied to all hazardous materials en-
tering sewers "destined for POTW, from the first entry of the chemi-
cals into the sewer system."71 The court declined to find otherwise un-
less Congress changed the statute. 72 Plaintiffs appealed to the First 
Circuit.73 
IV. THE FIRST CIRCUIT's HoLDING AND REASONING 
The first problem that the First Circuit faced was to define domes-
tic sewage. Domestic sewage was not defined in the statutes, and the 
EPA had written several different definitions for domestic sewage in 
their regulations and guidelines. The court held that the more restric-
tive definition, construing domestic sewage narrowly, most closely satis-
fied congressional intent. 74 
Even though the court resolved the ambiguity surrounding the 
meaning of "domestic sewage," a change in the facts711 caused the scope 
of the word "in" as it is used in the DSE to potentially become the 
controlling issue in the case. The court wrote that "defendants' sewage 
now appears to mix with 'domestic sewage' in the public line. Conse-
68. /d. at 1330. "Industrial waste which mixes with sanitary waste from on-site sanitary 
facilities for employees does not necessarily fall under the domestic sewage exemption, the indus-
trial waste must also mix in the municipal sewer system with untreated sanitary wastes from non-
industrial sources." /d. at 1330 n.10 (quoting EPA Document, Guidance for Implementing Per-
mit-By-Rule Requirements at POTWs, at 6 (Apr. 15, 1988) (emphasis added). 
69. Comite, 693 F. Supp. at 1328. "The parties agree that Congress enacted the DSE with 
the intention that the excluded wastes would be regulated by the Clean Water Act." /d. The 
district court concluded that Congress intended CW A to be the only statute governing industrial 
wastes mixed with domestic sewage "not only because such a system avoids double regulation but 
also because the system provides industry, government, and the public with more efficient and 
predictable bases for making important waste-disposal decisions." !d. 
70. /d. at 1333. 
71. /d. The decision concluded that Congress did not consider the problems of leakage or 
vaporization when it wrote the RCRA and that "[r]ewriting RCRA [was] the sole prerogative of 
Congress". /d. 
72. !d. 
73. Comite Pro Rescale de Ia Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180 
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990). 
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
75. Namely, the industrial park's sewage had previously run from the park to a "POTW 
which did not receive sewage from residences." Comite, 888 F.2d at 187-88. But "[s]ince Decem-
ber 1987, ... the Park's sewage has been treated at another POTW which also receives sewage 
from residences outside the Park." /d. at 188. 
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quently, the district court, in working with the words 'in domestic sew-
age,' may have to define the scope of the word 'in.' "76 Since the district 
court had not yet ruled on the meaning of the word "in," the First 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine what "in" 
meant. 77 
V. ANALYSIS AND PoTENTIAL IMPACT 
A. The Court's Deference to the EPA 
Recent court history in interpreting environmental law statutes 
shows a pattern of great deference to Congress and the EPA in virtu-
ally every environmental matter. The court found that this case was 
particularly suited to "accord 'considerable weight' to an 'executive de-
partment's construction' of a statute. " 78 The court's deference to the 
EPA for these highly technical matters is underscored by the First Cir-
cuit dicta at the end of the Comite decision: "In our view, it will be 
helpful if EPA continues to participate in this case, indicating its views, 
where appropriate, to the district court, as it continues to work with 
this highly complex statute."79 
1. Defining domestic sewage 
The court found it very difficult to determine the possible mean-
ings of domestic sewage, as they are neither finite nor discrete. Rather, 
the bounds of the meaning of domestic sewage lie along a continuum. 
At one end of the continuum is the most restrictive definition; that is, 
domestic sewage is only that waste which originates in domiciles or 
homes. The other end of the continuum would include any waste mixed 
with waste from homes or bathrooms, so long as it ended up at a 
POTW. 
Under the broad definition, companies can exempt industrial 
waste from RCRA coverage by mixing industrial wastes (including 
76. ld. (emphasis added). "[T]he scope of [the word 'in'] may vary, depending upon, for 
example, 1) whether a householder has poured down the cellar sink a caustic waste that will mix 
with 'sanitary waste' after a mere thirty foot pipeline voyage on its own, or 2) whether a plant 
pours down an industrial sink a caustic waste that will eventually mix, in a city sewer system, 
with residential 'sanitary waste' after a three hundred foot pipeline voyage on its own." ld. 
77. ld. It seems somewhat odd that the court would consider the length of the pipe that the 
substance travels through as an important factor to consider when determining whether the indus-
trial waste is "in" domestic sewage. This may mean that the court is focusing on the source of the 
hazardous waste when applying the DSE and not on whether the waste is later mixed with do-
mestic sewage. 
78. ld. at 186 (quoting Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984)). 
79. ld. at 188. 
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RCRA solid and hazardous wastes) with small amounts of sewage from 
homes so long as the wastes go to a POTW. This definition narrows 
the scope and application of RCRA. Under the narrow definition, sew-
age from homes loses its exempt status the minute that industrial solid 
or hazardous waste enters into the sewage system. This would cause 
the entire system to be subject to RCRA regulations. Of course, this 
definition would greatly broaden RCRA's scope. Weighing the conse-
quences, the court determined that a narrow reading of domestic sew-
age was appropriate.80 
a. Possible meanings of domestic sewage. The court began its ex-
amination of the definition of domestic sewage by considering two ways 
to think about domestic sewage. The court pointed out that one way to 
define domestic sewage is to think of it as a "type" of sewage. The 
other way to define it is to examine its "source" to determine whether 
or not it is domestic.81 
b. Five articulated arguments in favor of a narrow definition. 
The court decided to side with the plaintiffs and an EPA amicus brief 
and adopt a narrow definition of domestic sewage.82 The court gave 
five reasons for this decision. 83 
First, the word "domestic" comes from the Latin "domus" which 
means house. The court wrote that "we assume ... the legislative 
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. "84 
Therefore, domestic sewage should be defined as sewage from a house. 
Second, the words "domestic" and "sewage" seem to refer both to 
source and to type of discharges. Had Congress intended otherwise, 
they could have used a term like "sanitary waste" to specify only a 
type, not a source. 811 
Third, a broad definition of domestic sewage may frustrate the 
Congressional purpose for the DSE. Most industrial plants have in-
stalled toilets for their workers. The court recognized that the small 
amounts of sewage from these toilets could mix with industrial wastes 
in pipes under the buildings. If this mixture of industrial waste and 
small amounts of sewage material were excluded from RCRA, it would 
frustrate the Congressional purpose for including a means for injunc-
tive relief within RCRA.86 
Fourth, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended 
80. /d. at 184. 
81. See id. at 181-82. 
82. /d. 
83. /d. at 184-85. 
84. /d. at 184 (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986)). 
85. /d. at 185. 
86. /d. 
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broad RCRA injunctive powers. The "amendments 'clearly provide 
that anyone who has contributed or is contributing to the creation, exis-
tence, or maintenance of an imminent and substantial endangerment is 
subject to [RCRA] ... .' "87 However, this case may be most nar-
rowly read to limit RCRA coverage to only those instances where 
plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against an industrial pollution source. 
That was the nature of the case before the court. But it would not take 
a great leap of logic, once the door has been opened, for the courts to 
apply all of the RCRA and CERCLA provisions beyond requests for 
injunctive relief. It seems likely that if RCRA applies at all-that is, if 
the court can get over the DSE hurdle-RCRA will apply completely. 
Finally, Congress granted the EPA great power to fix and define 
terms under RCRA. The court viewed the RCRA regulations as part 
of a large Congressional plan to make a clean environment. 88 The court 
determined that Congress gave the EPA authority to interpret the lan-
guage of the statute. 89 
2. Defense arguments against a narrow definition 
The defense's principle argument was that the EPA had not de-
fined domestic sewage uniformly in implementing other parts of the 
RCRA. Notably, there was an instance in which the EPA wrote that 
"'Domestic sewage' means untreated sanitary wastes that pass through 
a sewer system."90 
The court rejected this reasoning for two reasons. First, the EPA 
denied that the domestic sewage definition above "include(d] sanitary 
wastes originating in factories. "91 Second, the court found that Con-
gress gave the EPA broad powers to interpret the statute, and the 
"EPA's reading of (the] regulation [was] not totally unreasonable 
[so the] argument (was] dispositive."92 
87. /d. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 48, reprinted in 1984 
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5607) (emphasis added). 
88. "The [domestic sewage exception language J constitutes a small part of a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme that Congress entrusted the EPA to administer, sensibly and in conjunction 
with other, related environmental regulatory schemes designed to secure clean water, clean air, 
and a safe environment." /d. (emphasis added). 
89. "[W]e interpret the statute as reflecting a congressional intent to give EPA considerable 
authority itself to interpret language like 'domestic sewage' and thereby fix, at the boundaries, the 
precise scope of the exception." /d. 
90. /d. at 186 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 261.4). 
91. /d. at 187. 
92. /d. Though the use of the "not totally unreasonable" standard for accepting an agency's 
definition of an ambiguous term is somewhat dubious, the ruling stands. 
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3. Additional arguments for the narrow definition of domestic 
sewage 
The court's decision to include sewage containing industrial waste 
under RCRA was proper when one considers the court's stated ration-
ale, along with arguments the court apparently did not consider. Be-
sides the court's articulated arguments, other arguments exist which 
support a narrow definition of domestic sewage for RCRA purposes. 
a. Public policy. The following congressional finding underscores 
the primary purpose for which Congress adopted environmental 
legislation. 
As a result of the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, 
and other Federal and State laws respecting public health and the 
environment, greater amounts of solid waste (in the form of sludge 
and other pollution treatment residues) have been created. Similarly, 
inadequate and environmentally unsound practices for the disposal or 
use of solid waste have created greater amounts of air and water pol-
lution and other problems for the environment and for health.93 
The EPA's difficulty in regulating the millions of households and other 
small producers of hazardous waste was mentioned above. Even though 
these wastes are small individually, they aggregate at the POTWs. To 
let these accumulations remain outside of RCRA control, while identi-
cal amounts of accumulated wastes (equally hazardous to the environ-
ment) are covered by RCRA, is flatly inconsistent with the stated con-
gressional purposes. The POTW is a logical candidate for RCRA 
coverage, precisely because they do transport, store, or dispose of what 
would otherwise constitute RCRA listed or characteristic materials. 94 If 
these hazardous substances are inherently dangerous when covered by 
RCRA, they are inherently dangerous even though excluded from 
RCRA. The damage to the environment is the same whether RCRA 
covered the discharges or not. 
Including industrial wastes mixed with domestic sewage under 
RCRA would at least ensure that final disposal of these accumulated 
hazardous materials would be consistent with their toxicity. Congress 
has already given the EPA the mandate that RCRA (and arguably 
CERCLA) should be fully integrated with other environmental legisla-
tion to ensure proper protection of the environment. 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (1988) (SWDA, § 1002(b)(3)). 
94. Listed materials include those substances identified by the EPA under authority of 42 
U.S.C. § 6921 (1988). Characteristic substances are those which the EPA has determined to have 
the characteristics of hazardous wastes but which are not formally identified on EPA hazardous 
materials lists. These materials are considered non-hazardous when they lose the hazardous char-
acteristics. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(h). 
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b. Benefits of diffused liability. Both CERCLA and RCRA allow 
the EPA, states, and other parties to seek contribution towards the costs 
of cleaning up hazardous wastes. Certainly, POTWs face paying these 
costs if the Comite decision opens the door for RCRA and CERCLA 
regulation of domestic sewage; but, from a public policy standpoint, 
applying these costs to the POTWs and industries who pollute the en-
vironment with RCRA wastes may be a very good thing. Theoretically, 
these "permitted" discharges are not being accounted for in the current 
economy. If the new decision required POTWs and industries to com-
ply with RCRA and CERCLA, they would undoubtedly pass some or 
most of the compliance costs on to the consumers or users of the facili-
ties. This passing on of costs would place the economic burden of com-
pliance and clean-up on the parties who all marginally contribute to 
the hazard by day-to-day living. Otherwise, the economic costs of our 
pollution are theoretically deferred to future generations. Thus, CER-
CLA and RCRA liability would enforce economic reality for the envi-
ronmental damage we all cause through our domestic sewer systems. 
4. Possible arguments against a narrow definition 
a. Complexity of the law and duplication of effort. One major 
argument against RCRA coverage is the confusion and conflict which 
may result from CWA and RCRA coverage of the same activity. Cer-
tainly, provisions of the CWA and RCRA are significantly different. 
RCRA coverage would require thousands of POTWs to file permit ap-
plications as generators, transporters, storers, or disposers of hazardous 
wastes. This would also require reconsideration of the terms "genera-
tion," "transportation,"96 "storage,"96 "treatment,"97 and "disposal."98 
95. Under CERCLA, transport or transportation "means the movement of a hazardous sub-
stance by any mode, including pipeline." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(26) (1988) (CERCLA, § 101(26)) 
(emphasis added). 
96. Storage, under RCRA, means "the containment of hazardous waste, either on a tempo-
rary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazard-
ous waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33) (1988) (SWDA, § 1004(33)). 
97. Treatment, under RCRA, means: 
any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change the 
physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so as 
to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste nonhazardous . . . . Such term 
includes any activity or processing designed to change the physical form or chemical 
composition of hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous. 
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (1988) (SWDA, § 1004(34)). 
98. Disposal means: 
the discharge, deposit, injection, sumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid 
waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or 
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted 
into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 
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At least, this new RCRA coverage may require new ways of thinking 
about those terms. 
For example, when should the hazardous material be considered 
hazardous if domestic sewage is included under RCRA? Life is too 
short to require each home owner or small business to obtain permits 
for "generating" hazardous materials simply because they dump 
Draino down a sink. Should we consider the POTW to be a "trans-
porter" for the time that the material is in the sewer pipe? When 
should the material cease to be the responsibility of the generator and 
be turned over to the POTW? These are only a few of the many ques-
tions which the EPA and the courts must answer if we include domes-
tic sewage mixed with industrial waste under RCRA. 
b. Problems of liability. RCRA and CERCLA liability would cer-
tainly have economic effects on local governments and industries who 
would potentially face joint and several liability for clean up of sites to 
which they contributed hazardous waste. They would also face all of 
the other actual and potential RCRA and CERCLA compliance costs. 
Although some major cities with healthy economies might with-
stand the increased economic burdens, most would not. RCRA and 
CERCLA liability would be particularly devastating to small towns, 
counties, and special sewer districts who are already facing serious 
budget problems. Clean up costs can easily exceed hundreds of millions 
of dollars per site. If any one of these became responsible for cleanup 
under CERCLA and faced joint and several liability as it now stands 
under RCRA, they could find that court costs and liability costs would 
completely destroy them. 
c. EPA inability to control the work load. Even if the EPA gains 
the authority and responsibility to enforce RCRA and CERCLA provi-
sions over domestic sewage systems which are now excluded, it is un-
clear whether the EPA could enforce them. We currently face massive 
environmental problems, and the EPA has a limited budget. Without 
enforcement, the rules might as well not exist. However, the EPA has 
the mandate to implement environmental legislation. If we want 
RCRA regulation of hazardous materials in domestic sewage, the an-
swer is not to abandon the cause because the EPA cannot handle the 
new responsibility without more help but to increase the size and 
budget of the EPA. 
d. Tougher CWA standards are possible. Another possible argu-
ment against RCRA coverage for domestic sewage mixed with indus-
trial wastes is the option of improving the CW A standards. Congress 
SWDA, § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). 
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could either toughen the sewage pretreatment standards, or write new, 
tougher legislation. Industry and POTWs are already familiar with the 
CWA and may be able to adjust to tighter regulations with less disrup-
tion of their operations and with a lower cost than if they had to com-
ply with RCRA. This would have the economic advantages of keeping 
the thousands of POTWs out of CERCLA and RCRA regulation 
while potentially accomplishing the same result. If industries more ade-
quately controlled their discharges, the POTWs would not have to treat 
industrial hazardous wastes. 
VI. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
One of the most serious problems with any significant policy 
change is that we cannot accurately determine what the implications of 
the policy decisions will be. However, some impacts might reasonably 
be expected. 
A. Economic Impacts 
Ultimately, the taxpayers would have to bear the increased costs in 
several areas. They would have to pay higher taxes to staff the EPA 
and adjust EPA regulations to the new DSE. They would also pay 
higher prices for sewer treatment. Finally, they would probably also 
pay higher prices for goods produced by industries which were required 
to pass on the higher cost of RCRA regulation to consumers. 
Even though these costs may affect taxpayers and industries, if 
they are necessary to clean up our environment, we will have to pay for 
them now, or we will certainly pay for the consequences later. One of 
the sad legacies our forefathers left us is the cost of cleaning up the 
mess they left by their poor industrial waste disposal practices. We 
should not continue putting off the burden of these costs to be paid by 
unborn generations. 
B. Effects on the Environment 
Theoretically, bringing domestic sewage mixed with RCRA haz-
ardous wastes under RCRA would improve the total environment. 
Currently, we dump millions of tons of hazardous materials each year 
down our sewage systems. These now excluded hazardous materials 
have the same negative impact on the environment as other identical 
hazardous materials dumped in violation of RCRA. But with any regu-
latory policy changes, there are always unforseen externalities. It is im-
possible to accurately predict what they will be. 
In a perfect world, we might expect that a limited DSE might 
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make a better, cleaner world. But the reality of business tells us other-
wise. One way POTWs may respond to a new DSE is that POTWs 
may cut off industrial service if it could mean freedom from RCRA 
liability. These industries, if POTWs cut them off, would have three 
choices. They would be forced to either close down, dump the materials 
illegally, or provide alternative disposal methods. Those companies and 
industries who could not afford RCRA compliance may also simply go 
bankrupt. If they did go bankrupt without cleaning up their wastes, 
they could leave behind serious contamination which would have other-
wise been treated at a POTW.99 Then the taxpayers or other responsi-
ble parties would have to pay for the clean-up. These abandoned pro-
duction sites and their related contamination may make the 
environment much worse than it would have been under a broader 
DSE. In fact, a combination of illegal dumping and abandoned sites 
could seriously degrade environmental quality. 
However, if a company or industry is unable to produce and mar-
ket their products without including the actual economic and environ-
mental costs, then they should not be in business anyway. If past envi-
ronmental excesses have taught us anything, it is the folly of ignoring 
environmental costs in producing goods and services. 
C. Where the District Court Should Draw the New Line 
The district court should adopt a narrow definition for the word 
"in" in the DSE. Domestic sewage should be subject to RCRA and 
CERCLA whenever it is contaminated by quantities of industrially-
discharged RCRA listed or characteristic hazardous materials which 
would trigger RCRA coverage if the waste was outside a domestic 
sewer. The DSE should be limited to sewage from houses. Industry 
should be subject to the same RCRA standards for discharges or dump-
ing of hazardous materials whether they dispose of them on site, off 
site, or through the sewer system. Treating sewer line discharges the 
same as any other discharge under RCRA would provide a uniform 
standard for industry to cope with and the EPA to manage with the 
least additional burden. 
VII. CoNCLUSION 
The First Circuit decision to open the door to CERCLA and 
RCRA liability for industrial wastes mixed with domestic sewage pro-
vides the potential for great improvement in environmental quality. In-
99. Even though the contamination may have been treated at a POTW, the treatment 
method may not have been completely effective. 
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dustrially-produced RCRA listed or characteristic wastes pose serious 
environmental hazards, whether or not they are dumped into domestic 
sewer systems or disposed of under RCRA. The economic and adminis-
trative costs of limiting the DSE by including industrial wastes mixed 
with domestic sewage under RCRA are very uncertain, although they 
are certain to be very high. 
RCRA and CERCLA liability for domestic sewage mixed with 
industrial waste have the potential for providing a fair mechanism for 
distributing economic and environmental costs on those who contribute 
these wastes. Without RCRA coverage, we are placing these costs on 
future generations by default. 
The district court should interpret "in" so that hazardous dis-
charges into domestic sewers bound for POTW s are treated like any 
other hazardous discharges under RCRA. 
Bruce C. Evans 
